Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 03238 01 OF 04 011758Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6625

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 03238

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: BAN ON NEW TYPES OF ICBMS (SALT TWO-1641)

REF: STATE 047440

1. DELEGATION EXPLANATIONS OF MEANING AND EFFECTS OF US NEW TYPES DEFINITION HAVE GENERALLY EMPLOYED FOLLOWING RATIONALE:

A. ONE OF ULTIMATE GOALS OF SALT II NEGOTIATIONS IS STRENGTHENING OF STRATEGIC STABILITY.

B. US HAS STRESSED NECESSITY TO LIMIT TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE DESTABILIZING EFFECT.

C. ICBMS ARE MOST DESTABILIZING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SINCE THEY POSE GREATEST THREAT TO SURVIVABILITY OF FIXED LAND-BASED MISSILE SYSTEMS, DUE, INTER ALIA, TO ACCURACY.

D. THEREFORE, US HAS PROPOSED BAN ON NEW TYPES OF
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PAGE 02 GENEVA 03238 01 OF 04 011758Z

ICBMS.

E. IN CONTEXT OF BAN ON NEW TYPES OF ICBMS, US HAS DEFINED "NEW TYPES" TO INCLUDE ANY CHANGES TO SIGNIF-ICANT COMPONENTS OF EXISTING ICBMS AND HAS SPECIFIED COMPONENTS IN AGREED STATEMENT. HOWEVER, SINCE DELEGATION UNABLE TO DEVISE SATISFACTORY CRITERIA

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

FOR WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE COMPONENTS OF A DIFFERENT TYPE, EXPLICIT DEFINITION HAS NOT BEEN GIVEN SOVIETS. ARGUMENT IS THAT MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING ICBMS WILL INCREASE THEIR CAPABILITIES AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO

DECREASED STABILITY. CAPABILITIES WHICH HAVE RECEIVED BULK OF EMPHASIS ARE ACCURACY IMPROVEMENTS AND SECONDARILY, INCREASED FRACTIONATION.

2. WITH RESPECT TO HOW DEFINITION WOULD AFFECT CHANGES TO EXISTING ICBMS, FOLLOWING SPECIFIC EXPLANATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE:

A. EARLE - "ONLY DIFFERENT HARDWARE, AS OPPOSED TO SOFTWARE, WOULD BE CONSIDERED TO CONSTITUTE A CHANGE IN COMPONENTS" - PLENARY, 13 OCT 77 (A-1810).

B. PEREZ - "SOFTWARE CHANGES NOT PROHIBITED" - PEREZ/ SHCHUKIN BILATERAL, 19 OCT 77 (A-1829).

C. "PEREZ AND SCHNEITER CONFIRMED THAT REPLACEMENT BY A WARHEAD OF A NEW TYPE WOULD CONSTITUTE A CHANGE IN MISSILE TYPE" - PEREZ/SHCHUKIN BILATERAL, 19 OCT 77 (A-1829).

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D. KARPOV ASKED, "...IN THE US DEFINITION OF A NEW TYPE, IF AN EXISTING MISSILE WERE EQUIPPED WITH A NEW TYPE OF PENETRATION AID, IT WOULD BECOME A NEW TYPE? GRAHAM SAID THIS WAS CORRECT." DRAFTING GROUP 161, 20 OCT 77 (A-1839).

E. PEREZ - "ONLY DIFFERENT HARDWARE, AS OPPOSED TO SOFTWARE, WOULD BE CONSIDERED A CHANGE IN COMPONENTS... HARDWARE INCLUDED SUCH THINGS AS MECHANICAL, ELECTRICAL, AND CHEMICAL COMPONENTS OF A MISSILE SYSTEM...SOFTWARE CHANGES WOULD BE CHANGES IN COMPUTER PROGRAMS, I.E., CHANGES NOT INVOLVING ALTERATIONS TO MATERIAL COMPONENTS. THE US AGREED STATEMENT TO ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL SPOKE ONLY OF HARDWARE." DRAFTING GROUP 162, 25 OCT 77 (A-1841).

F. NICKELS-LEMON - "WE NOTED THAT EACH MISSILE WAS DESIGNED TO PERFORM A PARTICULAR FUNCTION AND THAT CHANGES IN THE COMPONENTS WE HAD LISTED WOULD RESULT IN CHANGES IN THE CAPABILITIES OF THAT MISSILE AND IT THEREFORE COULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE OF A 'NEW TYPE'." NICKELS-LEMON/BEKETOV-JOURAVLEV BILATERAL, 27 OCT 77

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

(A-1844).

G. EARLE - "SHCHUKIN ASKED WHETHER US SHOUGHT TO FREEZE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY WITH ITS NEW TYPES PROPOSAL. I SAID WE SOUGHT PRECISELY THAT, INCLUDING FREEZE ON CAPABILITY. I ADDED THAT SOME SLIGHT IMPROVEMENTS

MIGHT NOT BE FEASIBLE TO PROHIBIT, BUT US WAS FIRM ON

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 03238 02 OF 04 011806Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6626

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 GENEVA 03238

EXDIS, USSALTTWO

THRUST OF ITS PROPOSAL." EARLE/SHCHUKIN RECEPTION CONVERSATION, 3 NOV 77 (SALT TWO-1463).

H. EARLE - "IT IS THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES THAT THE CAPABILITIES OF ICBMS SHOULD BE FROZEN AT THEIR PRESENT STAGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. ALTERNATIVELY, TO ALLOW SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN ICBM CAPABILITIES WOULD RESULT IN DECREASED STABILITY.... IN THIS CONNECTION, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT, TO BE EFFECTIVE, SUCH LIMITATIONS MUST NOT PERMIT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CAPABILITY OF EXISTING ICBMS. THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED THAT 'NEW TYPES OF ICBMS' BE DEFINED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT CHANGES TO THE SIGNIFICANT COMPONENTS OF EXISTING ICBMS WOULD RESULT IN THESE ICBMS BEING CONSIDERED AS NEW TYPES OF ICBMS." PLENARY STATEMENT, 1 DEC 77 (A-1951).

I. ROWNY - "I SAID THAT OUR PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT MODERNIZATION SO LONG AS CURRENT ICBM CAPABILITIES WERE NOT IMPROVED. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, I SAID, WOULD PERMIT UNRESTRICTED MODERNIZATION AND THUS HAVE THE EFFECT OF

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

CREATING 'NEW' MISSILES FROM EXISTING ONES." ROWNY/ BELETSKY BILATERAL, 1 DEC 77 (A-1914).

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J. HENKIN - "...US STATEMENT HAD REFERRED TO A PRO-HIBITION ON ICBM IMPROVEMENTS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN THEIR CAPABILITIES." PEREZ-MCNEILL-HENKIN/ SMOLIN-OBUKHOV BILATERAL, 1 DEC 77 (A-1922).

K. LCOL JOHNSON - "THE US KNEW ITS PROPOSAL COULD CAUSE SIGNIFICANT ALTERATION TO THE EXISTING PRACTICES OF THE SIDES WITH REGARD TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THEIR ICBM FORCES. HOWEVER, THE US WAS WILLING TO DEAL WITH PROBLEM, BECAUSE OF THE POTENTIALLY MORE SERIOUS EFFECTS OF INCREASED ICBM CAPABILITIES." JOHNSON-ANDERSON/BEKETOV-JOURAVLEV BILATERAL, 1 DEC 77 (A-1919).

L. EARLE - "...US PROPOSAL IS NOT INTENDED TO DENY EITHER SIDE THE RIGHT OR OPPORTUNITY TO PERFORM REGULAR MAINTENANCE, I.E., TO MAINTAIN THE CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF ALL OF EACH SIDE'S EXISTING ICBM FORCES." HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, 7 DEC 77 (A-1925).

M. EARLE - "...THE US VIEW OF OUR OBJECTIVE WAS TO FREEZE THE CAPABILITIES OF EXISTING ICBMS WHERE THEY ARE NOW, TO PERMIT REGULAR MAINTENANCE NECESSARY TO

KEEP FORCES OPERATIONAL, BUT ALSO TO BAN FURTHER THE QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF EXISTING ICBMS, IMPROVEMENT THAT WOULD ENHANCE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO ACCURACY AGAINST THE HARDENED TARGETS OF THE OTHER SIDE." HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, 7 DEC 77 (A-1925).

N. ROWNY - "I SAID WE REALIZE THAT PARTS COULD WEAR OUT AND IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REPLACE THEM TO MAINTAIN

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THE MISSILE'S OPERABILITY. HOWEVER, IF THE CAPABILITIES WERE IMPROVED, THIS WOULD MEAN THAT MODERNIZING A MISSILE WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF MAKING IT A 'NEW TYPE.'" ROWNY/BELETSKY BILATERAL, 9 DEC 77 (A-1979).

O. EARLE - "IF RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF MODERNIZA-

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

TION WERE DEFERRED UNTIL FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS, MODERNI-
ZATION OF EXISTING SYSTEMS DURING THE PERIOD OF
NEGOTIATIONS WOULD CREATE THE SAME SORT OF PROBLEMS AS
WOULD BE CREATED BY THE ABSENCE OF LIMITATIONS ON
ENTIRELY NEW SYSTEMS. AS THE SENATOR HAD POINTED OUT,
WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT EITHER SIDE SHOULD BE IN A
POSITION DURING THE SALT-III NEGOTIATIONS OF TRYING
TO LOCK THE STABLE DOOR AFTER THE HORSE HAD ESCAPED....
REFERRING TO EARLE'S LAST COMMENT, SEMENOV ASKED:
'THAT HORSE WHICH RAN AWAY, WHAT BREED WAS IT?'
EARLE REPLIED: 'ICBM ACCURACY.'" EARLE/SEMENOV DINNER
CONVERSATION, 19 JAN 78 (A-1984).

3. DELEGATION ASSESSMENT IS THAT SOVIETS UNDERSTAND US
NEW TYPES DEFINITION. FOLLOWING STATEMENTS SUPPORT THIS
CONCULSION:

A. "SHCHUKIN SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US
PROPOSED THAT A NEW TYPE OF MISSILE WOULD BE CREATED
IF A CURRENT MISSILE HAD ONE OF THE LISTED COMPONENTS
MODIFIED OR REPLACE." PEREZ/SHCHUKIN BILATERAL,
19 OCT 77 (A-1829).

B. SHCHUKIN - "UNDER THE US PROPOSAL, IF A PROBLEM
DEVELOPED WITH A SIDE'S MISSILES, IT COULD REPLACE
COMPONENTS WITH SIMILAR COMPONENTS, BUT IT COULD NOT
REPLACE THEM WITH DIFFERENT COMPONENTS." PEREZ/

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 03238 03 OF 04 011813Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6627

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 GENEVA 03238

EXDIS, USSALTTWO

SHCHUKIN BILATERAL, 19 OCT 77 (A-1829).

C. SHCHUKIN - "IN CONNECTION WITH MODERNIZATION OR

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

MAINTENANCE OF MISSILES, IMPROVEMENTS ARE INEVITABLE. THE INDIVIDUALS WORKING WITH THE MISSILE SYSTEMS WILL CONTINUE TO PUT IN REPLACEMENT PARTS THAT HAVE HIGHER RELIABILITY AND LONGER LIFE." JOHNSON/SHCHUKIN

DISCUSSION, 13 NOV 77 (A-1876).

D. SEMENOV - "THE ESSENCE OF THE US PROPOSAL WAS ACTUALLY AIMED AT BLOCKING THE NORMAL PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION OF CERTAIN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, IN SPITE OF AGREED PROVISIONS OF THE JDT." EARLE/ SEMENOV POST-PLENARY, 22 NOV 77 (A-1900).

E. BEKETOV - "IT WAS INCONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS TO FREEZE MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING SYSTEMS." JOHNSON-MIHNOVETS/BEKETOV BILATERAL, 22 NOV 77 (A-1891).

F. SHCHUKIN - "FREEZING ANY IMPROVEMENTS TO EXISTING BALLISTIC MISSILES (FOR EXAMPLE, GUIDANCE) FOR THE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 03238 03 OF 04 011813Z

PERIOD OF THE PROTOCOL WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND UNVERIFIABLE." SHCHUKIN/PEREZ-SCHNEITER BILATERAL, 29 NOV 77 (A-1908).

G. SEMENOV - "...SUCH PROPOSALS...PROVIDE FOR SOMETHING COMPLETELY DIFFERENT, NAMELY FOR BANNING MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS. AN APPROACH BASED ON MISSILE COMPONENTS INCLUDES AN ATTEMPT TO BLUR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING ICBMS AND SLBMS THE SIDES HAVE, WHICH ARE BEING MODERNIZED CONSISTENT WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY BEING WORKED OUT." PLENARY STATEMENT, 1 DEC 77 (A-1951).

H. BEKETOV - UNDER US PROPOSAL "...CHANGES REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN A RELIABLE ROCKET FORCE WOULD AT SOME STAGE RESULT IN A NEW TYPE OF ICBM." JOHNSON-ANDERSON/BEKETOV-JOURAVLEV BILATERAL, 1 DEC 77 (A-1919).

I. JOURAVLEV - "...ILLUSTRATED HIS DISMAY THAT, IN ORDER TO KEEP FROM MAKING AN IMPROVEMENT, ONE WOULD OR COULD DESIGN A COMPONENT WHICH HAD ALL THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE ONE IT WOULD REPLACE." JOHNSON-ANDERSON/BEKETOV-JOURAVLEV BILATERAL, 1 DEC 77 (A-1919).

J. SEMENOV - "...REACHING AGREEMENT ON ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL CANNOT AND MUST NOT MEAN A BAN ON THE MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING TYPES OF

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

ICBMS AND SLBMS, AND CANNOT AND MUST NOT OPEN THE WAY FOR ARBITRARY INCLUSION AMONG NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS TO BE BANNED, OF ICBMS AND SLBMS OF EXISTING TYPES, WHICH HAD BEEN MODERNIZED SUBJECT TO EXISTING PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY." HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, 7 DEC 77 (A-1925).

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K. SEMENOV - US "PROPOSAL FOR THIS ARTICLE OF THE PROTOCOL ENVISAGED SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT, NAMELY A BAN ON THE MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING TYPES OF ICBMS..." HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING, 7 DEC 77 (A-1925).

L. SHCHUKIN - "...SOVIETS DID NOT PLAN IMPROVEMENTS TO SS-17, SS-18 OR SS-19 DURING PROTOCOL PERIOD." EARLE/ SHCHUKIN RECEPTION CONVERSATION, 7 DEC 77 (SALT TWO-1537).

M. SHCHUKIN - "WITH RESPECT TO MODERNIZATION GENERALLY, HE OBSERVED THAT NOTHING MAJOR COULD IN FACT BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE THREE YEAR TERM OF THE PROTOCOL AND THEREFORE WHY SHOULD THE US WORRY. FOR EXAMPLE, NO NEW PROPULSION SYSTEM COULD BE DEPLOYED. HOWEVER, HE DID POINT OUT AGAIN THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN ACCURACY WOULD CONTINUE AND MORE ADVANCED PARTS WOULD BE INTRODUCED AS PART OF MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR." SEIGNIOUS-JOHNSON-HENKIN/SHCHUKIN BILATERAL, 9 DEC 77 (A-1931).

N. SHCHUKIN - "AS FOR REPLACING SOME COMPONENT OF A MISSILE BY SOMETHING THAT WAS MORE MODERN AND UP TO DATE, WHEN A GROUP OF TECHNICIANS INFORMED THOSE WHO ORDERED WEAPONS PRODUCED THAT THEY HAD MANAGED TO IMPROVE A SPECIFIC COMPONENT, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THOSE WHO ORDERED THE WEAPONS TO REFUSE THEM PERMISSION TO REPLACE THAT COMPONENT. IT WOULD BE ABSURD, HOWEVER, TO BELIEVE THAT REPLACEMENT OF A COMPONENT OR A NUMBER OF COMPONENTS COULD CONVERT AN

SECRET

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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6628

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 GENEVA 03238

EXDIS, USSALTTWO

EXISTING TYPE OF ICBM INTO A NEW TYPE. FURTHERMORE, SUCH REPLACEMENT COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE VERIFIED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS." EARLE/SHCHUKIN DINNER CONVERSATION, 17 FEB 78 (A-2061). EARLE

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Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

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Draft Date: 01 mar 1978
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20 Mar 2014
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